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FOREWORD: FOUR SENSES OF THE
PUBLIC LAW-PRIVATE LAW
DISTINCTION
RANDY E. BARNETT*
Perhaps the most useful function for a foreword to a sympo-
sium on the "Limits of Public Law" would be to explain what is
meant by "public law." If there is more than one sense of a
distinction between "public law" and "private law," identifying
which sense is being used in a particular instance should reduce
confusion. As it turns out, there are four different ways to dis-
tinguish between public law and private law that are relevant to
this Symposium.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP OF DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF LEGAL
REGULATION TO DIFFERENT DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
"PUBLIC" AND "PRIVATE" LAW
Each of the different usages of the terms public law and pri-
vate law arises from a different aspect of legal regulation.' "Legal
regulation" in this context means only that human conduct is
being subjected to some form of regular control or constraint
(including prohibiting conduct entirely) based on general rules
or principles. 2
There are at least four different aspects of legal regulation:
(1) the kinds of substantive standards used to assess the
types of conduct that may properly be subject to legal
regulation;
(2) the different status of persons or entities that may prop-
erly complain about violations of legal regulation;
* Associate Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent Col-
lege of Law. B.A., Northwestern University, 1974; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1977.
Professor Barnett directs the Law and Philosophy Program of the Institute for Humane
Studies at George Mason University.
1. Thomas Aquinas, quoting Aristotle, said that "it is better that all things be rcgu-
lated by law than to be left to the decision of judges." SUMMA THEOLOGIAE la2ae.
Question 95, art. 1 ("Are man-made laws expedient?"), second conclusion in reply
("meius ast omnia ordinaii lege quam dimni'erejudicum arbitrio"). Aquinas was referring to
Aristotle's statement: "Now, it is of great moment that well-drawn laws should them-
selves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the decision
of the judges ...." RHErORIC 1354a32 (Modern Library ed. 1984).
2. This is a much broader concept of "legal regulation" than its other usual refer-
ence to rules issued by administrative agencies-"tax regulations," for example.
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(3) the different status of persons or entities that are subject
to legal regulation;
(4) the different kinds of institutions that may be charged
with adjudicating and enforcing legal regulations. Each aspect
of legal regulation leads to a somewhat different use of the
terms "public law" and "private law."
1. Public Versus Private Standards of Legal Regulation
It is possible to distinguish between public law and private
law according to the kind of standard being applied to individ-
ual conduct. For example, some might say that if the publica-
tion of sexually oriented material causes a "public harm" or
violates a "public standard of decency" then it may be legally
regulated. Similar claims may be made about the consumption
of intoxicating substances. Here a "public," as opposed to a
"private," harm is used to justify legal regulation.3 With "pub-
lic law" of this type, that the regulated conduct may harm par-
ticular individuals is of only secondary, if any, importance.
Consequently, private harm usually need not be shown to es-
tablish this type of "public law" cause of action.
In contrast, some activities are regulated chiefly because they
result in "private" harm. That is, while conduct in question-
theft, for example-may offend public standards of "good"
conduct, it is legally prohibited because it is "wrongful" in that
it deprives a particular individual (or group) of something that
is said to "belong" to her (or them). Consequently, for this
type of "private law" cause of action to be established, particu-
lar or individual harm usually needs to be shown.
Of course, once this distinction between public and private
law has been drawn, some acts may arguably violate both kinds
of law simultaneously. Certain acts that are said to be "offenses
against society" may be considered sufficiently "public" in na-
ture to be classified as crimes. At the same time, many (but by no
means all) crimes-personal and property crimes, for exam-
ple-will necessarily involve the infliction of private harm. Such
"private" offenses may therefore be classified as torts, as well as
crimes. Appropriate "limits on public law" might be generated
3. See, e.g., J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, TIlE PHI.osoPn" OF Liw: INTRODtR'.TION TO
JURISPRUDENCE 170 (1984) ("The standard way of drawing this distinction is to say that
duties imposed by tort law cover privale harms, and those imposed in tile criminal law
cover public harms.").
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by a normative analysis that undermines the legitimacy of regu-
lating by law those actions that do not involve the infliction of
private harm.
2. Public Versus Private Complainants
According to a second distinction between public and private
law, "public law" causes of action are those that are usually
brought by governmental ("public") authorities. "Private law"
actions are those usually brought by the private individual who
was harmed (or her representative or heirs).' When this dis-
tinction is employed, the same standards may be applied in
either realm. What distinguishes public from private law in this
sense is who has standing to complain of violations of the
standards.
The issue of who may bring a cause of action, however, is not
entirely unrelated to the subject matter distinction just dis-
cussed. The enforcement of legal regulation is a costly activity.
If conduct that does not work a sufficiently great private
harm-that is, conduct that does not sufficiently harm a partic-
ular individual or discrete group-is made the basis of a regula-
tion of a "public law" type, then there will likely be no one with
sufficient incentive to incur the costs of prosecution. As a re-
sult, once public law based on "public standards" is recog-
nized, a need immediately arises to create "public" authorities
to enforce these kinds of legal prohibitions.
With "public law" of the first type, prosecution is said to be a
"public good" and the creation of tax-funded, monopolistic
governmental agencies to prosecute such activity is invariably
advocated. Consequently, the first type of public law, based on
public standards, very often becomes public law of the second
type-legal regulation enforced by governmental agencies.
The recognition of public law regulation of the first type, then,
carries with it practical consequences that ought to be taken
into account when assessing the wisdom and limits of such
regulation.
Most public law schemes are promoted to achieve a particu-
lar well-recognized and easily articulated benefit. Frequently
4. See, e.g., J. MURPHY &J. COLEMAN, suna note 3, at 170 ("In crimes, we rely upon
public officials, agents of the state, to enforce the relevant standard; in torts, the stan-
dards are enforced privalely, in the sense that the burdens of detection and initiation of
litigation fall on victims.").
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overlooked or minimized, however, are the costs that will likely
result from the creation of a public authority empowered to
pursue this kind of regulation. Such costs include the diversion
of scarce resources from other more useful activities, the likeli-
hood of vindictive or politically motivated prosecutions, and
the potential for infringing civil liberties.
In assessing the wisdom of public law regulation of the first
type, such costs are usually minimized or ignored, perhaps be-
cause they always appear speculative before the implementa-
tion of a particular public law. Moreover, even after
implementation, it may be difficult to show that it is the public
prosecution of a public law that has caused a particular harm.
The problems inherent to public prosecution alone, however,
argue for some "limits on public law," perhaps of a "constitu-
tional" nature. This need for limits has given rise to a third
sense of the terms public and private law.
3. Public Versus Private Subjects of Legal Regulation
A third sense of the public law-private law distinction stems
from the nature of the parties who are subject to legal regula-
tion. We might call laws that are meant to regulate the internal
conduct of governmental authorities and that define their rela-
tionship or duties to private individuals "public law." In con-
trast, we may call laws that define the rights and duties that
private individuals and groups owe to each other "private law."
Roman law, for example, "made a distinction between public
law and private law. The former was concerned with the func-
tioning of the state, and included in particular constitutional
law and criminal law; the latter was concerned with relations
between individuals." 5
By distinguishing the type of institution governed by legal
regulation, we may classify many legal categories as either
"public law" or "private law." Public law subjects would in-
5. B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION To ROMAN LW 2 (1962). For a comparable use of'
the distinction in contemporary constitutional analysis, see, e.g., Friendly. The Pubir-
Private Penumbra-Fourteen 1"ears ifLter, 130 U. PA. L. RF-v. 1289 (1982) (discussing the
distinction between state action and private action). Some have recently attempted to
connect the public-private distinction with liberal political thought. See, e.g. Kennedy,
The Stages of Decline of the Public/lPrivate Dklistilioi 130 U. PA. L. Rtrv. 1349 (1982). How-
ever, the antiquity or the public-private distinction suggests that it is somtewhat anach-
ronistic to exclusively identify it with liberalism. What is peculiarly "liberal" about (lte
modem use of the distinction is the fear that reliance on "public law" enflrcelnent
agencies will adversely affect individual liberty.
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clude constitutional law, criminal procedure, taxation, adminis-
trative law, and at least part of criminal law6-- each of which
seeks to regulate the internal workings of government or the
relationship between government and citizens. Private law sub-
jects would include contract, torts, property, corporations,
agency and partnership, trusts and estates, and remedies-sub-
jects defining the enforceable duties that all individuals owe to
one another.
The appropriate "limits of public law" in this sense would
stem from the special dangers that have historically arisen from
the creation of "public" agencies with tax-funded monopoly
powers. Such limits would be discussed within each public law
subject when problems are seen to arise within or between gov-
ernmental agencies and especially between governmental agen-
cies and private parties. Such problems may argue for limits-
constitutional constraints, for example 7-being placed on pub-
lic authorities.8
4. Public Versus Private Law Enforcement
The last sense of the public law-private law distinction con-
cerns the proper institutional framework for applying and en-
forcing legal regulation. Should the formulation of legal rules
and the adjudication of disputes that arise between persons and
groups be performed by monopolistic or governmental institu-
tions or by nonmonpolistic competitive institutions? In this
sense, then, "public law" would refer to monopolistically or
"publicly" provided legal regulation. "Private law" would refer
to legal regulation by "private" or nonmonopolistic legal insti-
tutions.' The subjects of evidence law, civil procedure and con-
6. That part of the criminal law that concerns harms inflicted on discernible victims
might be classified as private law according to this usage (although these crimes would
still be considered "public law" according to the first two senses of the public law-
private law distinction).
7. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND EMINENT DOMAIN 4-5 (1985)
(arguing that "a police power must be vested in the sovereign" but that the Constitu-
tion is needed to limit the ends that this power may serve and the means by which it
may serve them).
8. Some have questioned the ability to utilize the public-private distinction in legal
analysis. See Symposium on the Public-Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982)
(critically analyzing this distinction between public and private). But cf. Hegland, Good-
bye to Deconstnction 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1985) (generally defending the use of
general rules and distinctions in legal analysis from recent deconstructionist criticisms);
Shapiro, The Death of the Up-Down Distinction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 465 (1984) (parodying the
criticism of the public-private distinction in Kennedy, supra note 5).
9. The distinction between multiple and unitary legal systems is discussed in L.
No. 2]
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flict of laws, which are now thought of as exclusively governing
the administration of government institutions ("public law" in
the third sense), could as well be conceived as "private law' in
the third sense when such procedures are used by private
institutions.
Private law in this fourth sense is probably the least com-
monly utilized aspect of the public law-private law distinction.
But the discussion of private alternatives to governmental en-
forcement agencies is growing. If it can be shown that it is more
efficacious to provide law-making and adjudicative services
"privately" than publicly, then this would justify placing "limits
on public law" in this fourth sense of the term.
II. THE RELATIONSHIPs AMONG THE FOUR DISTINCTIONS
Distinguishing among the four senses of the public law-pri-
vate law distinction is useful for purely taxonomic purposes.
But the definitional discussion just completed suggests that
there are, if not logical, then strategic, relationships among
these four senses of the distinction. Once it is decided that
"public harms" or "public standards of morality or decency"
may be made the object of legal regulation-"public law" in
the first sense-then certain consequences unavoidably follow.
First, because inadequate incentives exist to assure the pri-
vate provision of this kind of law enforcement, it becomes nec-
essary to set up public agencies to prosecute violations of these
laws. But the creation of a monopolistic system of "public law"
enforcement (in the second sense) generates serious social
problems. "Public" institutions are given privileges and powers
normally denied to "private" institutions-the right to confis-
cate resources forcibly ("taxation" and "condemnation"), for
example-and this enhanced power increases the opportunity
for corruption and the ability to abuse those who do not have
such power.' 0 Consequently, so-called "constitutional" limits
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF THE LAW 123 (rev. ed. 1969) ("multiple legal systems do
exist and have in history been more common than unitary legal systems."). For two
recent discussions of the pluralist tradition in western law, see H. BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION 10 (1983); H. ARTHURS, WrroUT THE LAW: ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL
PLURALISM IN NINETEEN-CENTURY ENGLAND (1985). See also Friedman, Private Creation
and Enforcement of Law: An Historical Case, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 399 (1979) (describing the
ancient Icelandic legal system).
10. I have called the belief in the necessity of some such monopolistic legal institu.
tions the Power Principle and have discussed the serious difficulties that such institu-
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on such power are sought to protect against these dangers-
"public law" in the third sense.
This relationship suggests two proposals for legal reform.
First, we could eliminate the need for much of public law (in
the second and third senses) by eliminating our reliance on
public law regulation (in the first sense). The less we resort to
legal regulation where there is insufficient private harm, the
less we need resort to public prosecution in all its guises and
with all its faults." The less we resort to public prosecution,
the less we need to invent limitations on such power.
But what about "public law" in the fourth sense? Is not this
type of public law essential for the maintenance of social or
"public" order? A second area of possible reform would be to
pursue the private law alternative to tax-funded monopolistic
legal systems. While such a proposal has yet to be widely dis-
cussed,12 the foregoing discussion of the public law-private law
distinction suggests that it is an idea worthy of pursuit. If such a
private law system were possible, then it might avoid the need
to resort to public law with all its attendant difficulties. The ul-
timate "limit on public law" would then be no public law at all.
III. CONTRIBUTIONS TO TiS SYMPOSIUM
Each article in this Symposium may be seen as questioning
some aspect of public law regulation. But each article may dif-
fer from the others about which sense of "public law" is being
called into question.
Thomas W. Hazlett's article, Is Antitrust Anticompetitive?, tests
the boundaries of the first sense of the public law-private law
distinction. Many economists view antitrust laws as essentially
"private law" in nature-in both the first and second senses.
First, anticompetitive activity by firms is said to inflict private
harms, upon business rivals and consumers, that are said tojus-
tify antitrust regulations. Second, antitrust laws also take on a
tions create in Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society: Part One-Power vs. Liberty, GRIM.
JUST. ETHics, Summer/Fall 1985, at 50-56.
11. I discuss the serious problems that are created by one such brand ofpublic regu-
lation and the reasons why they arise in Barnett, Civng the Drug Law Addiction: The Hid-
den "Side-Effects" of Legal Prohibition, in DEALING wrrIH DRUGS (R. Hamowy ed.)
(forthcoming).
12. I sketch such a proposal in Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society: Part Two-
Crimne Prevention and the Legal Order, CRIM. JUST. ETHiCS, Winter/Spring 1986
(forthcoming).
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"private law" appearance when private "victims" of anticompe-
titive practices are authorized by such statutes to sue and col-
lect compensation for their "injuries." Professor Hazlett
questions whether permitting individuals such causes of action
is not itself anticompetitive and therefore unwarranted on the
assumptions made by antitrust proponents.
But there is also an important "public law" component of
antitrust laws. It is reflected both in the treble damages provi-
sions that seek to punish antitrust offenders much as criminal
law seeks to punish criminal offenders, and in the enforcement
of such statutes by federal and state officials. As significant as
its private law implications, then, Professor's Hazlett's analysis
would, if valid, undercut much of the rationale for public en-
forcement of antitrust laws-the second sense of "public law."
If the very practices being prohibited as being harmful to the
general public were in fact beneficial, then limitations on such
public law regulation would be justified.
In The Antitrust Tradition: Entrepreneurial Restraint, Yale Brozen,
a longstanding critic of antitrust laws, offers general support
for Professor Hazlett's analysis of the anticompetitive effects of
private antitrust actions, though with some reservations. In ad-
dition, however, Professor Brozen contends that the selection
of cases by government prosecutors has improved lately and
that judicial decisions have in recent years become more sensi-
ble. Finally, he defends a limited role for antitrust laws that it-
self is quite controversial: the use of antitrust laws to restrict
anticompetitive actions of government. This last suggestion
would move antitrust regulation into the third category of
"public law"-that is, principles that attempt to regulate and
limit the use of governmental power.
In The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, Juan Cardenas
discusses the enforcement of criminal law. Cardenas focuses
his attention exclusively on crimes where a private individual
has been victimized. His article calls into question the extent to
which we now rely on public prosecution of the criminal law-
"public law" in the second sense. Cardenas describes in some
detail the little-known history of private prosecution in America
and elsewhere and its eventual displacement by public
prosecution.
In The Lost Victim and Other Failures of the Public Law Experiment,
Bruce L. Bensen reinforces Cardenas's analysis of private ver-
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sus public prosecution and also expands the discussion to in-
clude past examples of private law-making and adjudication-
"public law" in the fourth sense. Knowledge that such institu-
tions actually existed and how they worked lends a much
needed historical perspective to the typically theoretical discus-
sion of the limits of public law enforcement.
James Branit's article, Reconciling Free Speech and Equality:
What Justifies Censorship?, chiefly concerns the first sense of pub-
lic law. He critically analyzes the regulation of sexually explicit
material that some have defended on "public" morality
grounds. But he concentrates primarily on recent attempts to
justify censorship on the normally private law basis- in the
first sense-that pornography causes private harm to individu-
als. He takes this private law argument for regulating sexually
explicit material seriously, but concludes that when private
harms occur, traditional private law remedies-not censor-
ship-are the appropriate modes of relief.
Geoffrey R. Stone's Anti-Pornography as Viewpoint Discrimina-
tion, on the other hand, shifts the discussion away from a pri-
vate harms analysis and towards a constitutional one-the third
sense of "public law." He analyzes the opinion authored by
Judge Frank Easterbrook in the recent case of American Booksell-
ers Association v. Hudnut,'3 which struck down one such ordi-
nance regulating the sale and possession of sexually explicit
material. Professor Stone concludes that this type of public
legal regulation is a form of viewpoint discrimination that is
contrary to well-established First Amendment limits on public
regulation.
In his article, The Ethics and Economics of Right-to-Farm Statutes,
Keith Burgess-Jackson assesses the efficacy and morality of re-
cent statutory limits on nuisance suits against and public regu-
lation of farming activity. His analysis implicitly raises the
question of how such statutes should be categorized. Are they
an unwarranted form of "public law" regulation (in the first
sense)? That is, are they inefficient or unjust public interfer-
ences with the private law rights of adjacent land owners? Or
do they merely codify the legitimate "private law" rights of
farmers that misguided theories of nuisance law have under-
mined? In their comment, Jo Kwong and John Baden accept
13. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affid mem., 106 S. Ct. - (1986).
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Burgess-Jackson's framework, but question some of the conclu-
sions he reaches about the efficiency of "right-to-farm"
statutes.
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